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ln 1311, barely a decade after the end of thc Sicilian Wars (1302). a mer-
cenary army from the Kingdom of Aragón conquered ihe Angevine Duchy of
Athens. While seemingly representative of the inherent instability of all the
Crusader kingdoms in the Eastem Mediterranean world, the events of 1311
marked the upset of the existing slatus quo and the general balance of power
that had been painfully devised in the región after the Fourth Crusade of 1204.
Though notably affecting the Angevine aspirations within European politics at
the time, the takeover of Athens by the Catalán Company primarily disturbed
the mercantilist interests of a quieter but unrivaled power in the región, Venice.
Within North American Medieval scholarship, with its Romantic over-
tones, the struggles and conflicts among the true Medieval (that is,
Mediterranean) powers have been degraded to a secondary level in the
accounting of Western European history. Not surprisingly then, an event of
the magnitude of the Catalán takeover of Athens has remained hardly un-
touched by historians in the West. Aside from Kenneth M. Setton and a few
other scholars1, the fact that Athens once belonged (o the Catalans for over
seven decades has been regarded by most Medieval historians as an unrela-
ted and ineffectual occurrence within the great evolution of western Europe.
Nonetheless, it is my conviction that the events of 1311, aside from de-
serving our interest and attention for their own sake, characterize a genera)
expansionist trend among Southern European societies, that outright
demanded the occupation of coastal áreas and cities as the safest mechanism
1
 Among the scant number of Works on Catalán Alhens written by Norlh American histo-
rians, Kenneth M. Setton's Catalán Damination of Alhens, I311-13IS. (Cambridge: 1948), re-
mains Ihe only in-depth study on Ibis subject, though it was first published over forty years ago.
to safeguard their trading routes. Consequently, these emporia, while pro-
vtding havens to merchant galleys, also permiled commercial activities with
the unoccupied hinterlands2. However, this policy could easily bring any gi-
ven pair of powers into open conflict and antagonism, especially when one
of them saw the other as intruding in their own «space». Essentially, the con-
flict that ensued between Venice and the Catalans in Athens after 1311
resulted from this zero-sum equational mentality.
During the thírteenth and fourteenth centuries, the foundations of the
Venetian empíre, rather than being located in a vast extensión of land, exis-
ted in the form of key islands and ports stretching all the way from Venice
to most states in the Eastem Mediterranean. In all, the Venetian empire for-
med a chain of safe ports and harbors which allowed Venetian merchant
galleys to sail undisturbed into the ports of Armenia, the Byzantine Empire,
Egypt, etc.
Thus, places such as Modon, Coron, Negroponte and Crete, more than
providing valuable resources to the Venetians, which in the case of Crete it
did, were vital possessions from where the trade routes to the East, the arte-
ries of Venice's economic life, could be effectívely protected against any pos-
sible enemy or threat. Venetian poücies for the Eastem Mediterranean outright
demanded economic privileges in and monopoly of the trading depots of the
East, conditions which could only sprang in a peaceful milieu, a pax Véneta.
By the late thirteenth century, however, the Venetian hegemony over
the Eastem Mediterranean was challenged by a rising Crown of Aragón,
which from the 1220s had undertaken an expansionist policy in the Medi-
terranean world. The Catalán takeover of Athens all but overtly signaled to
the Venetians a defiance to their control of the profitable eastem trade by the
Arago-Catalan empire. From the Venetian perspective, the Catalán pre-
sence in and control over Athens were directly orchestrated by the Arago-
nese Crown, as it had previously schemed the takeover of Sicily and Sardi-
nia; Venetian interests in the región deemed as urgent the total neutral i zation
of the Catalans in Athens.
Within this context, an analysis of survivíng Venetian and Catalán sour-
ces and documentation, for the first three decades of the fourteenth century,
2
 This colonial and expansionist pallcm prevailed among Western Mediterranean societies
until the center of European power shifted from the Meditenanean basin lo the Atlantic. Ho-
wever, it survived in the imperial evolutions of Portugal and The Netherlands in the fifteenth,
sixtcenlh and seventeenth centuries. Portugal, for example, occupied a chain of island groups,
like the Cape Verde and Sago Tome" groups, and ports, like Luanda (founded in 1576). exten-
ding all the way to India and her irade, A final sample of this policy can be seen in US expan-
sión in the Pacific. Nonh American merchants eould sail from California to China, after 1898,
without stopping at any foreign port. In all these insiances, such paltern of colonial expansio-
nism allowed these societies to protcct their trading routes, and to exert a direct control over
foreign markeis without having to spend their energies in governing or administering exten-
will reveal the distrust with which the Venetians observed the behavior of
the Catalán Company in Athens. For the Venetians, the Catalán Company
had too cióse lies with the mother ships, Sicily and Aragón. Likewise, Ve-
netian exasperation swelled in respond to the lukewarm actions taken by the
Aragonese and Sicilian crowns, whenever asked to control their bratty Ca-
talán Company. This all but proved to the Serenissima the Aragonese and
Sicilian plotting and manipulation of theeventsof 1311 thal brought about
Catalán domination over Athens.
For Venice, the conquest and takeover of the Duchy of Athens by the
Catalán Company was the last step needed by the Crown of Aragón prior to
crossing the threshold of complete commercial domination over the Medi-
terranean. More than a casual occurrence, the Catalán presence in Athens
was a meticulously schemed plot aimed at checkmating Venetian monopoly
of the Eastern Mediterranean trade.
I. TERRITORIAL EXPANSIÓN OF VENICE AND ARAGÓN
IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
The thirteenth century is clearly a period of territorial and economic ex-
pansión for both the Venetian Republic and the Crown of Aragón. Venice and
Aragón carved for themselves two insular and maritime empires in which the
bottom line was the assurance and growth of their trade routes and markets.
In the case of Venice, she already had mustered an economic empire stret-
ching to the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean, and her territorial enlarge-
ment in the East was a consequence of her trading empire. On the other
hand, Aragón had an imperial evolution in which her mercantile empire was
a consequence and not a cause of her territorial augmentation. Though Ara-
gonese and Catalán merchants were already numerous in the Westem Medi-
terranean waters prior to the territorial growth of the Crown of Aragón, her
conquest of several strategic islands and ports during the thirteenth century,
enabled Aragón to créate a trading empire that was carefully, if not worriso-
mely, watched by Genova, Pisa, and in the fourteenth century, by Venice.
Venetian land holdings in the East increased in the early thirteenth
century as a result of the Fourth Crusade. According to the Chronique de
Morée, several French barons joined forces in 1202 under the banners of a
new crusade3. Among the preparations undertaken for this expedition, the
barons requested the assistance of Venice in the form of galleys, which were
to transpon ihe crusaders to their destinalion, Egypt. However, and as a re-
3
 Among them. Ihe Chronique de Moreé menlions Geoffrey de Villehardouin and Ihe counis
of Champagne, Toulouse and Flandres. See íuan FERRÁNDEZ DE HEREDIA, Chronique de Mo-
reé, Osnabriick, 1968, pp. 1-2.
sult of a series of problems, the French barons could not come up with the
money lo pay the Venetians. In the ensuing negoiiatíons, ihe Venetians as-
ked for the aid of these crusaders in recovering the city of Zara, in Dalma-
tia, «wich [had] revolted [agains Venetian authority]»4. From Zara, and
due to a request from Alexis, the son of the Byzantine emperor Isaac II
(1185-1195/ 1203-1204), and of a papal légate, the crusaders marched on
Constantinople, returning in 1203 the imperial throne to Isaac and his son
Alexis (trie IV, 1203-1204). However, they were again overthrown in 1204,
but this time they were executed. The revolt led by the new emperor
Alexis V Ducas (1204), prompted another intervention from the cmsading
armies, which stormed and occupied the city in 1204.
The primary result of the Fourth Crusade was the establishment of the
Latin Empire of Constantinople. With the fall of the city, and with Pope
Innocent HI's blessipgs, the crusader armies took over the empire and di-
vided it among themselves. As one of the victorious parties, Venice re-
ceived threeeighth of the empire, territories that more than enhanced Ve-
netian ability to expand and protect her trade with the East5. Instead of
entirely occupying cheir newly acquired empire, the Venetians «unders-
tood that it was more prudent to limit themselves to a solid occupation of
ihe naval stations»6. Thus, Venice assume possession of only the Acayan
cities of Modon and Coron (both in 1206), and of the islands of Crete
(1204), and Negroponte (1209), entrusting the rest of her easlern do-
mains to Venetian families and autonomous representatives. In return for
these grants, they had to protect «the honor and interests of Venice in Ro-
mania and... her possessions and rights», as well as «ensuring to the Ve-
netians the safety and freedom of trading... and exporting without
playing any tariff»'.
Venice expanded her commerce during the thirteenth century within
this imperialisl framework. On one hand, she possessed important and
4
«(...) que, ho te pagasen toda la moneda que devian dar, o que ellos deviesen servir el co-
mún de Venecia en recobrar Jadra (Zara| que era rebellada...». FEBRANDEZ, Chronique. p. 8.
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 "El dicho legado dixo al capitán & á los otros que £1 era contento & les daua Licencia de
pait del papa que pudiessen tomar el dicho imperio de Contastinoble para ellos, reservado siem-
pre que, conquistando el dicho imperio de Contastinobltf, deuiessen dar al papa todo los dere-
chos eclesiásticos». FERRANDEZ, Chronique, p. 14. Regarding the partición of the Byzantine
Empire, the Chronique says that Venice received only one-fourth of it. However, as contem-
porary documentation atieste, the Venetian doge adopled the title of «dominus quatta partís et
dimidie totus imperii Romanie».
* George T. DENNIS, Byzaníium and Ihe Franks, 1350-1420, London, 1982, p. 220. Sce cs-
pecially chapter xvm, «Problemi storíci concernenti i rapporti tra Venezia i suoi domini diretti
e le signorie feodali nelle isole greche».
' «II s'emploiera pour l'honneur et l'interét de Vtnise en Rumanie et puur la conservation de
ses possessions et de ses droits». R.J. LOENEHTZ, By&ntina el Franco-Craeca (henceforth
BYZ), Rome. 1978, doc. 8, p. 145. «II assurera aux Vénetiens la securíté et la liberté de com-
mercer dans ses territorires. sans payer auoun droit». LOENERTZ, BYZ, doc. 9, p. 145.
strategic territories in the Eastern Mediterranean from where to safeguard
her trade. At the same time, she had several metropolitan-born rulers and
allies administering other Venetian áreas, where Venetian merchants en-
joyed economic and trading privileges. These satellite rulers also coope-
rated in checking any rising threat or power in the región8. Similarly, Ve-
nice also extended her sphere of influence over other áreas of continental
Romanía. In 1262, Guillaum de Villehardouin, prince of Acaya, signed a
treaty with the Serenissima, granting Venetian traders several conces-
sions, while giving Venke control over the weights and measures in the
región1*.
Altogether, by the second half of the thirteenth century, Venice had achie-
ved the undisputed mastery of the Levant's commerce. However, with the
restoration of the Byzantine Empire in 1261, Venetian mercantile activities re-
mained under constant attack from Constantinople, still at odd with the
Serenissima for her role in the wars of 1204. Nonetheless, Venice smoothed re-
lations with the Byzantines by the early fourteenth century. In 1302, Venice
signed a trade agreement with the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II, a treaty
that was followed up by several commercial concessions in 1303. Likewise,
trcaties were also signed at this time with Egypt, Syria, Tunis, and Persia10. In
all, Venice was lord and masler of the eastern trade. her merchant galleys rea-
ching ports from Tunis to Egypt, from Armenia to Constantinople.
Somewhat parallel in magnitude was the economic and territorial ex-
pansión of the Crown of Aragón in the thirteenth century. In the 122Os, the
Aragonese and Catalans had resumed their «holy reconquest» of the Iberian
península, launching an amphibian invasión on Mallorca. During the follo-
wing decade, they invaded and absorbed Muslim Valencia; by the 1270s,
their presence was also felt in North África, where they soon obtained the
island of Djerba, as well as economic concessions in the cities of Tunis and
Bona11. However, no prize was as coveted by the Aragonese Crown as the
Kingdom of Sicily. Since 1279, King Pedro III of Aragón was organizing
an invasión of this island, which his wife Constance claimed as inheritance
from her father, Manfred of Sicily, killed by Charles d'Anjou at the Battle
R
 «lis feron vive guerre au prince d' Achate ei ne concluront pas de paix séparée»*. LOENERTZ,
BYZ, docs. 48 and 49. p. 157.
' «Poids el mesures dependen! de Venise». LOENERTZ, BYZ, doc. 67, p. 161.
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 For the respective commercial trealies with Egypt, Syria, Tlinis. Persia. and Byzamium,
see George M. THOMAS, Diplomatarium Véneto-Levantínum (henceforth DVL), New York,
1880, docs. 4.5 and 6. pp. 5-12; doc. 17, p. 30; doc. 20, p. 33; doc. 2ó,p.47; and docs. 7 and 8,
pp. 12-19.
" For the conques! of Muslitp Valencia, see Robert I. BUKNB, S.Í., Muslims Chrislians,
and Jews in the crusader kingdom of Valencia, Cambridge, 1984. For the expansión of the
Crown of Aragón, see Ltufs NICOLAU D'OLWER, L'Expansió de Catalunya en la Mediterrá-
nia oriental, Barcelona, 1926, and J.L. SHNEIDMAN, The Rise ofihe Aragontse-Caxalan Em-
pire, 1200-1350, 2 vols, New York. 1970.
of Benevento in 126612. The Sicilian Vespers (1282), and the ensuing Sici-
lian Wars (1283-1302), resulted in the Arago-Catalan seizure of Sicily and
the enhancement of Aragón's mercantile influence in the región with the ac-
quisition of Malta, Pantelleria, and Calabria, áreas of strategic valué in the
central Mediterranean waters. The Arago-Catalan expansión was augmen-
ted by Pope Boniface VIII's grant of Sardinia and Corsica as fiefs to Aragón
in 1297. By the early fourteenth century, with the only exception of Corsica,
Aragón possessed or was in the process of dominating every major island
in the Western Mediterranean, while simultaneously controlling the Medi-
terranean coast from Provence to Alicante.
As with Venice. the territorial growth of the Crown of Aragón meant in-
creasing trade. By the tum of the century, Aragón was expanding her eco-
nomic activities into the Eastem Mediterranean, Catalán and Aragonese
galteys reaching the ports of Egypt, Armenia and Cyprus, while her mer-
chants traded in Damascus, Persia and Central Asia13.
Thus, by the early fourteenth century, Venice and Aragón had become
the two dominant powers in the Mediterranean trade. Up to then, Venice and
Aragón had remained at ease with one another, partly due to the confine-
ment of both powers to sepárate spheres in the Mediterranean: Venice to the
East, Aragón to the West14. Nevertheless, a series of events in the early four-
teenth century brought this coexistence to an al moa t certain end. At the cen-
ter of these events was the Arago-Catalan expansión in Romanía.
As early as 1304, King Federico III of Sicily expressed his hopes of con-
quering Acaya in a letter written to his brother Jaume II of Aragón15. Though
Federico's attempts failed, the threat posed by the Catalans continued with the
arrival and rooting of the mercenary Catalán Company. By 1311, the Catalán
had defeated the armies of Gualtier de Brienne, duke of Athens, at the Battle
of Cephisus. With de Brienne's defeat and death, the Duchy of Athens was left
at the mercy of the Catalans. With this, the mercantile machineries of Venice
and Aragón collided, for now the Catalán and Aragonese merchants had not
only «broken the Italian monopoly in the Westem Mediterranean... [but] were
free to challenge the Venetians in the Greek waters»16. What followed were ye-
ars of cautiousacts and strained relations between the Catalans of Athens and
the Venetians. For the next two decades, even though Venice and Aragón did
l :
 See Helene WURNSZOWSKI, «Conjuraciones y alianzas polflicas del rey Pedro de Aragón
contra Carlos de Anjou antes de las Vísperas Sicilianas», Boletín de la Real Academia de His-
loria, CVII (1935). 547-602.
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 SHNEIDMAN, The Rise, vol. 2, pp. 335-336.
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 Ramón MUNTANER, Crónica, Madrid. 1970, ch. 116, p. 251.
15
 «liem fa saber lo dit senyor rey Frederic al dii senyor rey d'Arago que ell [enten] sobra lo
feil de Romanía, qo n'a trames al senyor papa e enien lo dit [senyor rey] Frederic aver sobra
d'aquest feil aiuda e consell del dit senyor rey d'Aragón quan menester li sera». Antoni Rubio
i Lluch, Dipíomatari de VOriem Cátala (henceforth DOC), Barcelona, 1947, doc. Xi, p. 12.
'* SHNFIDMAN. The Rise, p. 347.
not clash militarily, the Catalans and the Venetians in Romanía found them-
selves in a struggle that would determine Venetian mercantile hegemony in the
11. CATALÁN PRESENCE IN ROMANÍA AND VENETIAN
RESPONSE. 1302-1331
The Catalán Company arrived at the Byzantine shores in 1302, as a mer-
cenary forcé recruited by emperor Andronicus II, and entrusted with the
defense of the imperial holdings in Asia Minor, imperiled by the ever in-
creasing menace of the Turks. As recorded in Ramón Muntaner's Crónica,
Roger de Flor, with the approval of Federico III of Sicily, sent an embassy
offering his and his army's services to Andronicus, «for the Turks have
deprived him of a thirty days journey of his land»17. Soon after their arrival,
however, the Catalans fought and massacred the Genoese merchants in
Constantinople, a massacre that proved beneficial and advantageous to the
Venetians, who subsequently filled the vacuum created by the annihüated
Genoese18.
However, the business arraignment struck between Andronicus and the
Company did not last long. Muntaner blamed Andronicus's son, Michael IX
Paleologus, for the hostilities that ensued between the Byzantine emperor
and the Calalans. Muntaner pointed to Michael's jealousy towards Roger de
Flor, by now megaduke of Ihe empire19. Likewise, Muntaner accused An-
dronicus of attempting to embezzle the Catalans by paying their services
with devalued coins, an action that «he did maliciously...[for] he would
rather have preferred to see every Frank [Catalán] either dead or out of his
empire»20. Regardless of the absolution given by Muntaner to the Com-
pany, the fact remains that the Catalans had emerged as a powerful forcé
within the empire; on one hand, they defeated the Turks in Anatolia and the
rebel lord of Lampsaki, thus commanding considerable military strength,
while on the other, Roger de Flor, head of the Company, had achieved a po-
werful and influentia] position within the Byzantine ruling hierarchy. An-
dronicus II logically reacted to this unfolding power by attempting to root
it out; massacres of Catalans followed in Constantinople, Adrianople and
17
 MUNTANER, Crónica, ch. 199. p. 411.
18
 MUNTANER, Crónica, ch. 202, p. 416. The massacres of Genoese merchants in Constan-
tinople coincided, not surprisingly, with the signing of a Veneto-Byzamine economic and
commercial agrecment (see n. 10).
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 MUNTANER. Crónica, ch. 203, p. 420.
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 «Y esto lo hacía él para mal, y para que entrase odio y mala voluntad entre el pueblo y la
hueste, pues en cuanto él hubo logrado lo que se proponía, en todas sus guerras, quisiera que
los francos estuvieran todos muertos o fuera del imperio». MUNTANER, Crónica, ch. 210, p, 432.
Gallipoli. This last site remained as a foeus of Catalán resistance for cióse
to three years (ca. 1305-1307). By Ihen, ihe Catalans had moved into Ro-
mania, where they survived by pillaging and ransacking the local
population21.
At the same time the Catalán Company left (he vicinities of
Consiantinople, Federico III of Siciiy, stili nominal lord of this merce-
nary forcé, appointed his nephew, Ferran of Mallorca, as his represen-
tative to lhe Company22. Nonetheleess, Bernardo de Rocafort. the new
leader of the Company, refused to acknowledge Federico as theír lord;
inslead, Rocafort nominated Ferran himself to this position. Ferran op-
posed this move of Rocaforl, but remained with the Catalans until iheir
total evacuation of Gallipoli and relocation in Salónica. Once there, Fe-
rran departed on his journey back to Siciiy, ajourney cut short by his
arrest at Venetian Negroponte. The Venetians then turned him over to
the Frenen officials at (he Duchy of Athens23. During Ferran's captivity
in Athens, the Catalán Company, under orders from Jaumel II of
Aragón, swore allegiance to Charles of Valois, Jaume's brother-in-law24.
With the Frenen assuming control over the Company, Ferran was libe-
rated. Simultaneously, Bernardo de Rocafort was turned over to Roben
of Naples (1309-1343), by Charles of Valois1 agent in Romanía, Thibault
de Cepoy. Rocafort met his death in Naples; the Catalán Company,
though under the guardianship of de Cepoy, remained leaderless in
21
 For an in-deplh analysis on lhe role uf lhe Catalán Company within theeastem política!
arena, see Roben I. BURNS, S.J.,»Catalan Company and the European Powers, 1305-1311»,
Speculum, XXIX (1954), 751-771.
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 «ítem, promtsit dictus dominus noster rex ac consensit et voluit. quod dictus dominus Fe-
randus recipiatur et habeatur a prediela gente dicti domini regís que est in diclis partibus Ro-
manie ut persona dicti domini nostrí regís et tamquam vicem et tocum tenens in dictis parti-
bus eiusdem domini nostrí regís, et quod predicta gens dicti domini nostri regis, que est in dictis
paitibus, eidem domini infanto Ferando, nomine et pro parte ejusdem domini regís, facial fi-
dem el homanagium*. RUBIO I UUCH. DOC, doc. xxxrl, p. 39.
23
 MUOTANER, Crónica, ch. 235. p. 484. Burns has indicated that al this point Veniee.
though securing more amicable and profitable relaüons with the Byzantines, still saw «the great
Valois crusade-plans against Byzantium... as Che long-range but permanent solution to her Le-
vantine woes». Thus, Venice's complicity in Fenan's incarceratioo resulted from her desires to
set a political milieu that would ensure her economic domination. See BURNS. «Catalán Com-
pany», p. 754.
M
 «qua propter nos omnes et singulos vestrum affectuose rogamus ac fidelltati vestre qua
nobis natural iterestis astricti precipimus et mandamus, quatenus sicuti graciam noscram caram
geritis, ac nobis desideratis placeré nostreque satisfácete voluntati, sic in negociis imperíi su-
pradictis placeré pro dicto comité [Charles de Valois] agitis fideliter, sol licite, fervíde, prese-
verantes in eis, sicque strenue ac viríliter insistaüs, vestra laudabilia principia fine laudabili con-
cludendo. ut inde vestra probata strenuilas, laudis apud omnes extollatur preconio, coram
nobisque erficiaminL propierea obedientes et gratih insuper et dictt consaguinet nostn qui labores
vestros el menta largiílue et liberaliter compensabit omnes vestrum et quilibet digne retríbu-
cionis premium consequatur». RUBIÚ I LLUCH, DOC, doc. xxxix, p. 49.
Romanía. Thibaut de Cepoy was unabie to assert his control over the
Company, relinquishing it in 1310. Joseph Petit indícales, in a manner
which seems to eternalize the Frankish apathy towards the Catalán Com-
pany, that «what little Muntaner revealed to us regarding the Catalán
Company shows the impossibility of leading..., this undisciplined
people»25.
An unexpected development in Levantine politics, however, brought
new hopes to the Catalán Company, which continued its wandering and
sacking of the Greek countryside. Earlier, in 1308, Guido de la Roche,
duke of Athens, had died heirless. In 1309, the new duke and candidate
of Robert of Naples, Gualtier de Brienne, arrived to his domains and
found the cilies of Neopatras and Epirus in open revolt against his rule,
outright declaring their independence from the duchy. While Setton in-
dicates that de Brienne turned to the Catalans due to his urgent need for
an army2fi, de Brienne might have been following orders from his Ange-
vine bosses, whom, as Robert I. Burns has demonstrated27 sought the uti-
lization of the Catalans for their primary goal, the reestablishment of a
Latin empire in the East. Though Gualtier de Brienne recovered Neopa-
tras and Epirus wifh the assistance of the Catalans, conflicts soon ensued,
in what Muntaner labelled as the attempt of de Brienne to dispose of the
Catalans, namely by paying their services «with a noose»18. The result of
this clash, as already mentioned, was the Baltle of Cephisus, in which
Gualtier lost not only his duchy, but also his duchy.
The menacing presence of the Catalans in Athens was already a matter
conceming the Venetians since 1308. In a letter to the baiulus of Negro-
ponte, Belletto Faletro, the Venetian doge, Pietro Gradenigo (1289-1311),
expressed his concern over the announced marriage belween Bernardo de
Rocafort and the sister of Guido de la Roche, duke of Athens. Gradenigo fe-
ared the Catalans' intentions, «specially of their coming and taking over the
island of Negroponte»29. Fortunately for the Venetians, Thibault de Cepoy
handed Rocafort over to Robert of Naples, who had him executed.
However, Venice's preoccupation did not die with Rocafort. In 1309, Fa-
letro notified Gradenigo of an anti- Venetian alliance between the Catalans un-
der Cepoy and some Greeks. Gradenigo ordered the baiulus of Negroponte to
deferid the island, «taking care of our honor and the safety of Negroponte»30
! )
 See M U N T A N E R . Crónica, ch. 239, pp. 4 9 1 - 4 9 3 .
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 See S E T T O N , Catalán Domination, p f 3
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 B U R N S , «Catalán C o m p a n y » , p. 763 .
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 M U N T A N E R , Crónica, ch. 240 , p. 494.
Rocchaforte, magnum marescalum totius socieíatis..., el de inlemione ipsorum, specialiler de
veniendo ad accipiendum insulam Nigropomis». R.J. LOENERTZ, Les Chisi: Dyna&tes Vénetiens
dans l'Archipet, ¡207-1390 (henceforth LG), Florence, 1975, doc. 19. p. 201.
The convergence of a series of events encapsulated the rationale behind
the Serenissima's defensive schizophrenia. which equated the Catalán Com-
pany with the Crown of Aragón. The Company was always preceded by the
banners and royal pennants of the House of Aragón, whose Sicilian mem-
bers held the title of dukes of Athens and Neopatras. Also, the attempts by
the Papacy and the Angevines to intégrate the Catalán Company into their
broader crusading schemes for the East, whích were to an extent beneficial
to Venice, had completely failed due lo the Catalans' independent-minded
behavior and Jaume of Aragón's lighthearted support to these efforts31.
Thus, and although the Company was a highly independen! political entity.
for the Venetians and other powers in the región, the Company was directly
connected to and controlled by the Crown of Aragón, which strived to break
the Venetian trade monopoly in the East. Venice perceived the Catalán ta-
keover of Athens as providing this mercantile power with the stepping stone
needed to domínate eastern trade, using for this purpose the always mena-
cing Turks from Asia Minor.
Consequently, the first years of Catalán rule in Athens were marked by
a hysterical diplomacy on the part of most power in Romanía, a diplomacy
that aimed at effecting the withdrawal of the Company from the duchy. If
anytning can be said regarding the Venetians at this time is that their diplo-
macy was characterized by the shrewdness and pragmatism that would en-
tail them to remain as an active power in the región long after the of Cons-
tantinople to the Turks in 1453.
For four years, from 1311 to 1314. Pope Clement V pjotied to rid Ro-
manía, and his French allies, of the Catalán invaders, first by using them in
another crusade to the Holy Land32, and later by demanding their evacua-
tion of Athens, under the threat of excommunication3-1. Neither martyrdom
ñor God's wrath got them out of Athens. Meanwhüe, Venice devoted her-
self at securing her role in the East. In 1315, Federico III of Sicily announ-
w
 «...procurando que nostrum honorem respicíant el salvationem ierre Nigroponlis...», LOTÍ-
NERTZ, LG, doc. 23. p. 204.
31
 Burns indicated that -As Rubio i Lluch asiutely notes, [Jaume] never for an instant lost
sight of his jurisdiclion over the Company. He could and did disavow Ihis connection when po-
licy so counselled». BURNS. «Catalán Company)', p. 767.
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 «apres senyor jo en P. de Querall ab en G. Olomar ensems parle ab la vicecanciller del
papa d'aquests fels largament, recomtali lot (o que haviem dit al senyorpapa, ne que aytant com
ell nos n'avia respost, e ell dix nos que ayiant com ell concxia be, tenia per impossible e por
sobre difficil, passatge qui s faes en la ierra sancta per mar, mas be venia que si Granada n'era
levada, que leu seria nom en la Barbería e puys per [erra ferma sen pona hom anar de La e que
aquesta era la conquesta rahonabla e possíbla». RUBIO [ LLUCH, DOC, doc. LII, p. 66.
^ «et tam celsitudinis tue quam universonim fidelium quos fidei zelus angit, intersit huíus-
modi pestilenii sevitie reprobórum solicilis studiis celen bus et oportunis rcmediis obviare, se-
renitatexn re^iam rogamus et obsecramus in domino tibí in remjs&ionen peccaminum iniugeri*
tes, quatinus pie considerans quam sit meritorium apud Deum partes illas cultas fidelibus ac
lot solemmes eeclesias et alia innúmera pia toca ecclesiasticasque personas partium earumdem
ced to Venice that he had exiracted a promise from his nephew, Ferran of
Mallorca, that he would «not offend your Commune», during his forthco-
ming attack against French Acaya34. In theory, this reassurance would ha-
ve pleased the Serenissitna, but the thought of a Catalán Acaya could only
have cast the fear of an uncontrollable bleeding to the hemophiliac Venetian
monopoty over the eastern trade. Acaya was not simply another plot of
land in Romanía. Rather, its control by a hostile mercantile and maritime
empire such as Aragón could endanger Venetian interests at and control of
Modon and Coran; Athens emasculating the Venetians at Negroponte. If
fate ever showed her love for the Serenissima, it was when Ferran died late
in 1316, after almost succeeding in his undertaking.
While Modon and Coron survived Catalán encroachment, Negroponte
proved to be the Venetian Achules' hee! v¡s-á-vis the Catalans. Though the
nominal ruler of Negroponte, Venice had relied on vassals for the admi-
nistration of the island. However, this system often proved to be proble-
matic, primarily due to the continuous bickering and rivalry among these
representatives of the Commune. A year after the death of Ferran, Mat-
hildede Hainaut, princess of Acaya (1313-1318), asked Doge Giovanni
Soranzo (1312-1328), to mediate a dispute between Boniface of Verona,
lord of Carystos and of a third of Negroponte, and Andrea Cornaro, lord
of Carpalhos and a sixth of the said island. According to Mathilde, Cor-
naro had allowed 2.000 Catalans from Athens to enter the city of Negro-
ponte, thus threatening ihe entire island with a Catalán take over. The Ve-
netians responded by sending a new baiulus to Negroponte, Francesco
Dándolo (1317-1319), with an army ready to defend the island against the
Catalans".
But no sooner had Dándolo been appointed when news arrived of the
impending marriage of Alfonso Fadrique, successor to his brother Man-
fred to Ihe ducal throne of Athens, with Mariaof Verona, daughterof the
lord of Carystos. This marriage, for all practica! purposes, gave Alfonso
abhuiusmodi peste et exterminio liberare universis de regno et tenis tuis in dicta socieiate mo-
rantibus sub certis temporalibus penis, prout celsitudo tua expediré cognoverit, des per tuas lit-
teras in matidatis, jpos aliis salubnbus monitioniHus d hortiiTioniHus itiducendo, ut parles illas
castra, tenas et villas ac loca quecumíiui' <|nt- m iliai». pmbu* fiítolihus abstulerunt et occu-
parunt el detinent occupata, ecclesiis oí imhihbus ¡ilii^m- tulclibus ilkirum partium quorum
esse noscunlur, libera et expedita dimii-iuiu HL-L ikiiiLips m pifiiidnium partium illanim so-
cietati adhercant supradicte, sed panes ipsus umiiinu dinucUiu, ad illas in prejudicium fidelium
eas habitantium nullaienus reversuri». RUBIO I LLUCH, DOC. doc. LXVI, p. 83.
M
 «quam etiam mutuae obligationes quae ínter nos et eum hacienus obvenerunt, dudum an-
tea requisitionem per dictum vesmim nuntium nobis factam, vestris semper indemnitatibus pro-
videncio, ac homagium ad forutn Aragoniae, Usagium Barchinonensem manibus et ore ac cor-
porale ad sancta Dei Evangelia juramentum de non offendendo Comúne veslrum, vos, el
subditos vestros». RUBIO i LLUCH, DOC, doc. LXXV, pp. 92-93.
" LOENERTZ, BYZ, doc. 5, p. 187.
and the Catalans a solid foothold in the island of Negroponte. As a resitlt
of this and similar instances of Catalán expansión, Catalán-Venetian re-
lations, or confrontaron, in Romanía reached a tense and hectic peale in
theyears 1317, 1318, and 1319. The Catalans wereseemingly puttingall
theirefforts ¡ndestroying Venetian control overthe Aegean islands. In 17
and ISMarch 1318, Jean de Gravina, prince ofAcaya (1318-1333), Ro-
ben of Naples and Philip of Tarento wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo no-
tifying him on (he attack launched by the Catalans on Negroponte56. Li-
kewise,on2l June 1318,andón 16 July 1318, the dulceofCrete, Niccola
Zane, reported to Soranzo an attack by a combined Turco-Catalán forcé
at Sitia, on the northeast coast of the island37. On 26 June 1318, Francesco
Dándolo wrote Soranzo informing him of a Catalán galley that had tra-
velled to Anatolia and returned with 1.000 to 5.000 Turks to an undis-
closed deslination, most likely Athens38. Again, on 16 July 1318, Zane
wrote another letter to Soranzo indicating that there existed an alliance
Negroponte-19.
Thus, for the Venetians, the Catalán takeover of Athens was the first
phase of an Aragonese (and Turkish), scheme to expel the Serenissima
from (he área, and to assume their trade monopoly. While the hostilities
ensued in Romanía, Venice sent a diplomatk mission to Federico of Si-
cily, father of Alfonso Fadrique, hoping to put an end to the attacks by the
Company on its galleys and citizens40. In (he mean time, Alfonso Fadri-
que wrote a letter to Francesco Dándolo, stressíng that the Catalans «in-
deed intend [ed] to observe the [existing] truce for [the saxe] of peace and
tranquility» with the Venetians41. Nevertheless, the first response on the
part of the Sicilian monarch to Venetian aecusations, was to categorically
refute them. On an attack by Alfonso's men against a Venetian galley
from Crete, that had oceurred in the gulf of Negroponte, Federico pointed
out that the aforementioned galley was in reality from Thessalonica, and
its crewmen were from that city, ruled by the Byzantine emperor. «who
is the enemy of the Román Church and of every faithful Christian». Thus,
36
 RUBLO I L L U C H , D O C , does . LXXXIX, XC & x a , pp. 108-110.
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L'Armeno-Veneio, Venice 1893, doc . 280 , p. 142; R u m o i L L U C H . D O C , doc . x c v m , p. 119.
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 T H O M A S , D V L , doc. 6 3 , pp. 109-110.
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 «nos del iberaveramus et feceramus q u e n d a m nost ium so lempnem ambaxatorem mit ten-
dum, et ja tn misi tnus ad dominus regem Freder ícum ipsius Alfonsi genitorem, et speramus
quod per ipsam nostnun ambaxa lam ipse diclus rex taJiler ordinabit et faciet c u m effectu, quod
facta Negropont is» , R U B I O i I X U C H . D O C . doc. xen , p. 111.
J l
 «nos enim t reguam araore pacis et tranquil i tatem vobis el ves iris ¡ntendeimib inviolabili-
ter observare». R U B I O I L L U C H , D O C , doc. x c v , p, 115.
it was «proper for Ihose men of the aforesaid Company to capture Ihe afo-
remenlioned hostile galley, the men and the things in it»42.
Similarly, as for Alfonso'* attempts to invade the island of Melos, Fede-
rico dismissed the charges of wrongdoing on the grounds that the lord of this
island, Guglielmo Sañudo (1303-1323), though Venetian, was a vassal of the
princess of Acaya, Mathilde de Hainaut, also an enemy of the Catalans. The-
refore, «it [was] proper for the said lord Alfonso to invade the said island, and
in this the said Commune had not been harmed. for...the said island belongs to
the princess of Acaya..., and Ihe said Commune has no right in the aforemen-
tioned island»43.
In the end, Federico demanded from the Venetians the restoration of se-
veral castles, towns and lands in the island of Negroponte to their righteous ow-
ner, María of Verana, wife of Alfonso Fadrique44. Though Federico seemed to
have turned the table on Venice, he immediately dispatched an embassy (o Ve-
nice, entrusted with «settling with the aforesaid Commune, sindicales, procu-
rators or legates of the same Commune, the damages inflicted by both sides»,
and with «reaching a final peace and agreement, or a long lasting truce between
the said Commune of Venice, her citizens and subjects, and Alfonso and the
entire aforesaid army [the Catalán Company]». However, in doing so, the Si-
cilian embassy had to ensure that «Alfonso and Maria, his wife, [would] be
allow to take possession of [their] towns and lands in the island of Negro-
ponte», and that Venice would not «forcé the said Alfonso into paying homage
[to them]»45. Federico's attitude and policy, thus. demanded a peace or non-
aggression pact with Venice, without limiting Catalán territorial —and eco-
nomic— expansión in the East. Venetian possessions would not be directly
targeted, but all other áreas were considered up for grab, and Federico
hoped they would consequently Catalans.
42
 «quod predi fia barca e[ homines existentes in ea fueruní de regno Salloníchi ac oriundi
de regno predicto, quod regnum est sub dominio imperatoris Constant inopoli tani , qui irapera-
tor est hostis Romane ecclesie ac omnium fidelium chris l ianorum, et sic licul illis de socielate
predicta capere hosiililer barcam predictam, homines el res existentes in ea». R U B I O I L L U C H ,
D O C . doc. cm, p . 124; T H O M A S , D V L . doc. 64 , p. 110.
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 aet ad c o m p o n e n d u m cum communi predicto, sindicis, procuraior ibus seu nunlijs com-
munis ipsius d e d a m p n í s ulrinque illatis...
»et ad ineundum el iam t inalem pacetn et conconí iam vel longam treguam ínter dictum
c o m m u n e Venet iarum, cives et subditos eius ac eosdem Alphonsum et universi laiem predicti
• q u e competunt dicto Alphonso et Mani le , uxori eius, ¡n castris et t e n i s possitis in Ínsula
Nigropontis , nec non obl igandum dictum Alphonsum ad presenta t ionem servitij...». R U B I O I
L L U C H , D O C , doc. CIV, p . 127-128; T H O M A S , DVL, doc . 65 , p . 114.
A truce was worked out by ihe end of 1318. On it, Alfonso and María re-
ceived their holdings in Negroponte, but only after agreeing to withdraw from
Romanía all their «galteys or ships,.., with the exception of one galley or ship
for [the solé purpose of| sending news or envoys»46. By 1319, a peace treaty
was signed by Venice, Sicily and the Catalán Company. After the customary
introduction of the parties involved in the treaty, the first condition imposed by
the Venetians aimed at protecting their interests in the región, namely the trade
routes and sealanes. The Catalans in Athens were forbidden from having any
armed galley in the duchy, ñor in the waters of Negroponte, except from those
already there, which nevertheless had to be stripped of all weapons. Likewise.
the Catalans in Athens had to end and discourage all piratical activities in their
lerritories, while paying reparations to Venice and its citizens for whatever da-
mage the Catalans might nave inílicted upon the Commune47.
With the treaty of 1319, Venice coped with the first major crisis in her
relation with the Company. For the time being, the Venetians had establi-
shed and underlined the fact that they were the masters of the Eastern Me-
diterranean and of its trade. The Serenissima was not about to tolérate the
expansionist policies of any maritime or mercantile power in Romanía. Ho-
wever, the Catalans in Athens soon found ways to circumvent the treaty of
1319. While the agreement was renewed in 1321, far from settling down all
[he disputes between the Catalans and the Venetians, the events which fo-
llowed 1321 brought with hem anew wave of awes for the Venetians and
the resumption of hostil i lies48.
Several tangible factors remained trully unsolved and tainting Venetian-
Catalan relations in the región. At issue were the control of Carysios, the du-
bious economic activities of the Catalans, and the political and military be-
havior of the Company. At stake were Catalán presence in Romanía, and
Venetian monopoly of the eastern markets.
After 1319, the issue of Carystos was at least nominally resolved. While
the right of Alfonso and María to the city was recognized by Venice, Ma-
ria's brother, Tomassino, took possession of this strategic port with the
approval of the French princes and barons of Acaya, and of Venice. Howe-
ver, Tomassino died in 1325; Alfonso and María revived their claims to the
city. On March 1326, Pietro dalle Careen, Beatrice de Noyers (of the Ve-
rana family), and Bartolomeo Ghísi informed Doge Giovanni Soranzo of
Maria's presence in the island, and her demands to receive the city of Carys-
ios. They had refused granting her control over the city, for they considered
44
 nquod predicia Compagna non nabeat nec teneai nec leneri facial in Romanía in aliquu
parte galleas vel lígna de eursu sea a remis, salvo quod habere possint unarn galleam vel lig-
num tantum pro nuntijs el novis mittendis». RUBIO i LLUCH, DOC, doc. cvi, p. 129; THOMAS,
DVL, doc, 66, p. 115.
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 RUBIO I LLUCH, DOC. cix, pp. 132-134; THOMAS. DVL, doc. 70, pp. 120-121.
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 See S E T T O N , Catalán Dominalion, p . 27.
thís as posing a ihreat to Venice's interests, and thus asked Soranzo for his
advised on chis matcer4''. The city was occupied by the Catalans that same
year, and continued as a source of malaise between the Company and the Se-
renissima until 1365, when Venice bought and occupied the city.
A similar problem revolved around Calalan trade activities in the región.
The control of Athens by the Company provided Catalán, Valencian, Ma-
llorcan, and Sicilian merchants with a lee in the Eastern Mediterranean
from where their trade with Constantinople, Cyprus, Armenia, etc., flouri-
shed50. Among the most profitable commodities obtained in the East were
slaves; however, the methods emptoyed for their acquisition, namely piracy
and kidnapping, brought the condemnation of the Catalans by the Avigno-
nese Papacy and the indignation of other powers in Romanía51. Both piracy
and slavery, however, were common commercial activities practiced by
every mercantile society; whether Christian or Muslim, in the medieval
Mediterranean basin. Therefore, neither the condemnation by the Papacy ñor
the military retaliations conducted by others against the Catalans, had as its
foundation moral outrage or a notion of Christian duty to eradicate this
evil. In the case of the Avignonese Papacy and the French nobles of Acaya,
their disgust toward Catalán activities ultimately reflected their desire to ex-
pel the Catalans from Athens. Likewise, they hoped that in doing so, they
could, restore the ducal dynasty of the de Brienne, relatives of the Chátillon
family, whose member, Gaucher de Porcieu had been constable of France,
while his daughter, Jeanne de Chátillon, was the widow of Gualtier de
Brienne, the Athenianduke killed in the Battle of Cephisus in 1311".
For the Venetians, these activities of the Catalans underlined their un-
ruliness, as well as the threat that they posed to the stability of the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Catalans. both from Athens and other territories under
the House of Aragón, and their Turkish and Greek associates had repeatedly
seized Venetian possessions, and ransacked their merchant galleys in Greek
waters53. Piracy and Turco-Catalán attacks on Venetian citizens had been a
matter addressed by the Venetians in their negotiations with the Sicilian
"LÜHNERTZ, BYZ, doc. i!, p. 189; Rumo i LLUCH, DOC, docs. c:x*x, CXX*I. cxxxii &
CXX-xm.pp. 161-164.
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 Jesús LALINDE ABADIA, La Corona de Aragón en el Mediterránea Medieval 1229-1479,
Zaragoza, 1973, pp. 218-219.
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 On the slave trade, see LALINDE ABADIA, La Corona, p. 322.
" Pope Ciement V excommunicated Üie Catalán Company ¡n 1314 (see RUBIÚ i LLUCH,
DOC, docs. LXIV & LJCVI. pp. 80-81, 82-83). Pope John XXII renewed this excominun ¡catión in
1323 (see RUBIO I LLUCH, DOC, doc. cxx. pp. 148-149), and the han of excommunication was
in effect until 1363. In 14 June 1330. Pope John XXII preached a cnisade against the Catalans
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" See, for example, RUBIO I LLUCH. DOC, doc. cxxvi, pp. 157-158; THOMAS. DVL, doc. 63,
p. 110.
crown in 1318 and 1319. As already statcd above, the treaties of 1319 and
1321 torced the Catalans to disarm all their galleys in the Duchy and in the
surrounding waters, and to discourage all filibustering in the área. However,
while the Catalans in Athens refrained themselves from engaging in these
activities, as might be deduced from the lack of documentation to this effect
after 1321, a conversely augmentation of these ventures by Catalán subjects
from other áreas, namely Catalunya and Mallorca, offered neither consola-
tion ñor guarantees to Venetian interests and merchants. The boldness of Ca-
talán piracy quickly rendered whatever promise they had made worthless.
From the Venetian perspective, the worst pan was the support Catalán
buccaneers received from the Crown of Aragón. On 27 January 1329,
Jaume III of Mallorca (1324-1349), petitioned the intervention of Doge
Francesco Dándolo (1329-1331), on behalf of some Mallorcan and Catalán
merchants who had been attacked, and their goods stolen by the Venetians
in the island of Cerigo in 1326. The said merchants were en route from The-
bes to Cyprus, when bad weather forced to seek refuge at Cerigo. Once
there, their galley was assailed by the local Venetian subjects, resulting in
the death of several crew members54. Dándolo ordered Cretan duke Gio-
vanni Morosini to conduct an ¡nvestigation regarding these allegations55.
However, thís inquiry revealed that the said merchants had engaged in fi-
libustering and had attempted to kidnap «men from the island in order to
extract them [from Cerigo] and sell them [as slaves]»56. Nonetheless, on 27
August 1329, the Crown of Mallorca again requested the intervention of
Dándolo on behalf of the same merchants57.
Facilitated by the possession of Athens, piracy by subjects of Aragón,
Mallorca and Sicily, escalated in the East. This, in conjunction with an ag-
gressive political and military behavior on the part of the Company during this
decade, resulted as before in strained relations and on a fragüe peace between
the Venetian Commune and Catalán Athens. Though Federico of Sicily might
have desired a temporal respite on hostilities with Venice, so as to concéntrate
all his energies against his traditional Angevine foes, the Company, while res-
ponding to Federico's expansionist wishes, followed their own plans of hos-
tile behavior. Venice, on the other hand, had assumed the role of the Ea.stem
Mediterranean policess. As a result of this, whenever the Catalans attacked
Venetian territories or any other state in Romanía, Venice had to respond in
order to avoid the erosión of her power in the Easl.
í J
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pro portando extra ad vendenum el etiam capiebant ammalia...». Rutiló I LLL;CJ-L DOC, doc.
cxLvn.p.lSÍ.
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Already by the turn of the century. Venice had reevaluated her eastem
polícy so as to aecommodate the interests of France and Byzantium. Howe-
ver, this required bringing two hard core enemies lo a peaceful coexistence.
First, Venice had to deal with Angevine desires to restore the de Briennes to
Athens and the «Latin» empire in Constantinople. Secondly, the Serenissima
continued to discourage the Byzantine pursue to recréate its former imperial
glories, primarily by booting the Angevines ftom Romanía. If this was nol
enough lo handle, Venice had also to figure out what to do with the disrup-
tive behavior of the Catalans and Turks. In all, Venice strove to unite all
Christian powers in the región against the detrimental presence of the Turks.
This unífication of powers would have created a virtual immunizaiion of Ve-
netian commercial concems, as Venice assumed the leadership of this Euro-
pean alliance. Only the threat posed by the Catalans, vía cheir association with
the Anatolian Turks and anti-Western Greek rebels, had to be checked59.
As in 1319, when the forces of Alfonso Fadrique conquered the city of
Neopatras and then annexed it to the Athenian duchy, the Catalans followed
an expansionist blueprint which had among its goals the debacle of Frenen
Acaya. The House of Aragón had previously tried unsuccessfully to subju-
gateAcayain 1315.But,by 1321, the oddsof a Catalán takeoverominously
went against the French, who also had to face Üie claims of a Byzantine em-
peror endeavoring to rebuild past honors.
On June 1321, Pietro Gradenigo, Provincial of the Friar Minor in Ro-
mania and representative of the French barons of Acaya to the Venetians,
requested the intercession uf Venice on behalf of French interests against the
attacks of the Byzantines on the principality. Gradenigo had granted ipso
facto control and suzerainty over Acaya to the Venetian Republic, since the
Serenissima had truces with both the Byzantine emperor and the Catalans.
Though the Catalán Company had been the only other altemative at the dis-
posal of the French barons, they still considered the Company a real threat
to their own survival60. Meanwhile, on 21 July 1321, Robert of Naples
summoned all his barons from Acaya, to organize the defense of the prin-
cipality beset by a combined Greek and Catalán offensive61.
However, Venice remained neutral, for her siding with the French ba-
rons would have escalated the existing antagonism and undermined Chris-
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tian powers vis-á-vis the Turks. Thus, when on 2 September 1324. Roben
of Naples proposed to Venice an alliance against the Catalans and Byzanti-
nes62, Venice answered that she «had a truce with the Byzantine emperor
and with the [Catalán) Company, on account of which she could not enter
into any alliance against them»63. In all, Venice maneuvered through these
political crises hoping that the existing equilibrium would endure. Unfor-
tunately, Venice was the only one to recognize the importance of her
policies.
Although the doves's keenness prevailed in Venetian policies toward
the East, the hawks's growls did not go unhéard, having as their tnost elo-
quent exponent the person of Marino Sañudo. Renowned as a fourteenth
century canographer of the Mediterranean, Sañudo displayed an insightful
understanding of the Eastern Mediterranean's political milieu. This un-
derstanding legitimized itself through the consanguineous ties Sañudo had
with the duke of Andros, Marco Sañudo, with the lord of Melos, Francesco
Sañudo, with the duke of Naxos, Guglielmo Sañudo, as well as with other
members of this patristic family, which had extensive commercial and
mercantile interests in Negroponte, Alexandria, etc. Likewise, Sanudo's
network of acquaintances webbed Doge Giovanni Dándolo (1280-1289),
several baiuli of Negroponte, the House of Anjou, Roben of Naples and po-
pes Clement V (1305-1314), and John XXII (I316-I334)64.
In a letter from 1325, Sañudo reminiscently accounted to Ingerano Ste-
lla, bishop of Capua and advisor to Roben of Naples, the ominous events of
1319 and 1320. The conquest of Neopatras and a score of other cities and
castles by the Catalans in 1319, foretold the grandiose machinations and de-
signs of the House of Aragón in the Eastern Mediterranean. By 1320, Odo
de Novelles, marshal of the Catalán Company, had married the sister of Ga-
briel Melissenos, the Byzantine lord of Castri and Lekhonta, fueling the des-
pondeney of the Venetian lords scattered throughout Romanía, for whom the
Catalans meant nothing but troubles6'. By March 1326, Sañudo alluded to
the territorial pretenses of the House of Aragón, which, in the person of Fe-
derico of Sicily, had assumed lordship over the Company in 1312. But
another intolerable characteristic of the said Company, was its amicable re-
lations with the Turks, a group that Sañudo augured would cause in con-
junction with the Catalans much hardship and sorrnw to the Vendían shft.
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These auguries all hut lurned inio realiiy as Sañudo reponed the raids con-
ducted by ihe Turks on Negroponte and several other islands, from which
Christians were expatriated and led to servitude and slavery in Muslim
lands67.
Sanudo's demagoguery unfolded exhilaratingly as the Crown of Aragón
overwhelmingly completed her occupation of Sardinia. In this, Sañudo saw
the unquestionable rise of Aragón as a forcé to be reckoned with if Venice
and the Angevines were to preserved Romanía.
[For] our lord the king [Roben of Naples] oughi to know well the Catalana,
how they are made like ticks, for wherever they settle they cannot be removed
unless they are dead. And his magnificence well knows how much time it is
since they carne into Sicily, then Sardinia was given to them so that they may
leave Sicily, and they hold [now|. Sardinia and Sicily, and the Duchy of Athens
with a good pan of the aforesaid Blachia [Thessalia]; and are they satisfied?
Certainly not. Indeed, ihey look every day for a fictitious way and manner to
transgress, so that war might occur, lo nave Negroponle, and if they have Ne-
groponte, ihe other islands of Romanía will not be able 10 resist not falling into
lheirhands;and, with time, dangerwill increasefortheislandof Crete, andalso
Morea..., will come into their handsh*.
The prophecies of Sañudo were the more nefarious when considering
the strong and tradilional friendship that existed between the Catalán Com-
pany and the Turks of Asia Minor. Sañudo then urgently demanded the cre-
ation of an alliance among Naples, the Papacy, the Byzantine Empire, and
Venice, aimed at checking this rising threat and especially at destroying any
possible contact between the Turks and the Catalans69.
Turbuleni were indeed these years for the Venetians in Romanía. A third
treaty wilh the Catalans was signed in 13317ÍÍ. As in 1319 and 1321, the Ve-
netians demanded the total demilitarization of the Catalán naval forces in the
región, and in their ceasing in assisting or engaging ¡n any pirática! activities
^ «quod dominus noster Rex bene debet cognoscete Cathelanos, quantum ipsi facti sunt ut
ceccha, nam ubi se ponunt non possunt extrahi nisi mortui. El nene novii sua magnificentia
quantum est quod venerunt ¡n Sicilia, postea eis data Sardinia, ut dimilterent Siciliam, el ipsi
tenent Sardiniam el Siciliam et ducatum Alhenanim cum bona pane Blachie predicte; et con-
tentatur ipsi? Cene non. Imo {sicj colidie querutil viam et modum perforandi, ut fácil terre-
bellum, pro habendo Nigroponte; et si habebunt Nigropontem, alie insule Romanie non pote-
runt resistere quod non perveniant ad manus eorum; et etiam imminetur periculum longitudine
letnpori insule Cretensi, nec non et Amorea, quam tenent Latini et Greci, foret provenienda in
manís eorum». CERLINI. Nuove Uttere. pp. 351-352.
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in trióse walers. The Venetians also required that the Catalans desíst trom par-
take in any new agreement or coalition with the Turks, and from aiding or wel-
coming them in the duchy and their army. At the same time, the Catalans had
to provide military assistance and support to the Venetians against the Turks,
if tríese were ever to attack the island of Negroponle. Finally, the Venetians res-
tricted the building of any new fortification ín the territories of Carystos71.
The treaty of 1331 began a period of rapproachment and amicable re-
lations between the Catalans of Athens and the Venetians. This ireaty did
nice and the Company, both of whom entered into this accord as a way
to divest their attention into other áreas of Romanía. The Catalans were
now facing a crusade preached against them by John XXII and led by
Gualtier II de Brienne, claimant to the ducal throne. Gualtier, with the as-
sistance of the Avignonese Papacy, the French barons of Acaya, and Ro-
bert of Naples, was scheming to recover the land lost by his father in
131172. For her part, Venice was in need of addressing the rising power
of the Turks and Genoese, while closer at home she had to cope with dis-
sension among her subjects and the escalating power of Hungary. By
1332, the Catalans were fighting the forces of de Brienne, while Doge
Francesco Dándolo was urging his subjects in the Levant to ally with the
Byzantine Empire againsl the Turks71. Thus, the treaty of 1331 was not
only an attempt by the Venetians and the Catalans at solving their diffe-
rences, but also an impending urge to provide some peace to a región that
was little by little becoming a world of anarchy and chaos.
Nevertheless, somefhing was accomplished in the year 1331. After
twenty years of wonries and frantic efforts, the Venetians had neutralized
any Arago-Catalan or Sicilian venture of using the Duchy of Athens as a
stepping stone to the East and its markets. With the treaty of 1331, the Ca-
talán connection had finally becn chcckmated.
CONCLUSIÓN
The first three decades of Catalán presence in (he Levant, were charac-
terized by the Company's constant warfare and strife with its neighbors and
masters. While some powers in the East saw their conflicts with the Cata-
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lans as a matter nf honor, patrimony or divine command, the Venelians per-
ceived this as a struggle to preserve their economic supremacy and mer-
cantile monopoly in Romanía. The Company was not just a handful of mer-
cenaries in need of fighting to satisfy an innate urge, as portrayed by
Francisco de Moneada74; lo the Venetian eye, this army was a tentacle of the
Aragonese and Sicilian crowns. extending itself to grasp and choke the Se-
renissima's trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. As early as 1204, with the
fall of Constantinople to the crusading armies. Venice had toiled to créate
a political environment in Romanía that would have ensured her hegemo-
nic pólice role in the región, while safeguarding her commercia! dealings.
Venice upheid this policy through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
making only the necessary adjustments required by the ever changing nature
of the Levant's political arena.
However. by the early fourteenth century, Venice faced (he continuous
challenge posed by the Sicilian crown to her economic and political mas-
tery in the East. The Catalán Company was instrumental to Sicilian ex-
pansionist policy in Romanía. From 1302 to 1311, the Company remained
highly autonomous in devisíng its own policies, but, from 1311 onward,
Federico of Sicily profitably realigned the Company's endeavors along his
schemes of territorial augmentation in the Eastern Mediterranean. This, to
a large extent, was a prolongaron of Federico's perennial quarrel with the
Angevines. Nonetheless, this vendetta directly affected Venetian policy and
blueprints. For one, Catalán behavior in Romanía utterly shattered the sta-
tus quo and balance of powers set in place by Venice. Likewise, Catalán te-
rritorial growth enhanced the commercial and trading aspirations of Ara-
gonese, Mallorcan and Sicilian subjeets, aspirations that targeted Venetian
monopoly of the eastern markets. Altogether, Venice viewed the Catalán
Company as a dangerous contender for her preeminent position in
Romania.
Venetian responses to these challenges manifested themselves in a
threefold manner. First, Venice attempted, with much success, to emas-
cúlate Catalán military might in the región. On one hand, the Serenissima
mustered a considerable forcé to confront the Company whenever and
wherever necessary. On the other, and though worthless at times, Venice
exacted promises from Catalán Athens, putting an end to any understan-
ding or cooperation between the Turks and the Company. The Venetian
Commune also forced the Catalans to demilitarize their territorial hol-
dings and navy. Secondly. the Venetian martial policy thwarted any eco-
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nomic growth the Catalans might nave foreseen for themselves in the
región. The Catalans were unable to turn Athens into a new Barcelona,
and, as indicated by Setton, «Athens had not..., like Modon and Coron,
the activity of a regular stooping place for pilgrims on their way to Jeru-
salem ñor of a depot in transit for goods passing from the islands and the
mainland of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Venetians in Negroponte
saw to that»75. Finally, as Venice achieved the economic and military we-
akening of Catalán Athens, she sought to intégrate the Company to her
preconceived status quo, as well as to channel Catalán warring behavior
toward a «good» cause, the war against the Turks. However, this aspect
of Venetian response was not entirely successful. For one, Venice could
not smooth the relations among the Angevines, the Byzantines and the
Catalans, all of whom hated the others to death. Similarly, the Catalans
did not always ascribe to the Venetian-imposed ban on all associations
with the Turks. Though both Venice and Catalán Athens foughl and
defeated the Turks, in 1364 and 1365 respectively, this European war
against the Turks was the actual product of a confrontation between
Venice and the Company76.
In all, though the treaty of 1331 asserted Venetian position vis-á-vis
the Catalans, it did little in bringing all European parties in Romanía to
an acceptable and enduring coexistence. As a matter of fact, it did not
even solve all the problems upsetting Veneto-Catalan ties. For one,
Carystos continued to be a discordant note in their relations. In 1360. the
Serenissima claimed to have bought the city, but the Fadriques, the heirs
to Alfonso and Maria, denied their ever having sold this strategic pon to
Venice77. It was not until 1365 that Venice was able to occupy this dis-
puted city in the island of Negroponte. Similarly, there were instances
of Catalán piracy78, Venetian interventionism79, and the like until the fi-
nal days of Catalán domination over Athens. However, if Ihese events
did not escálate into a direct or open showdown, other problems in the
regions. namely the Turks, the Genoese, and the Angevines, should be
held equally accountable. Veneto-Catalan relations were, after all, one
small facet in the multifarious history of the Eastern Mediterranean.
And though the Avignonese Papacy was clearly at odds with the Cata-
lans, the Venetian clergy at Athens, led by archbishop Niccola Salomono
(1345-1359), consistently worked to maintain a Chrisiian unity that the
rest of Europe seemed to have forgotten. Their labor contributed to a less
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antagonistic undcrstanding heiween Catalán Athens and the Venetian
Commune*1".
In the end. the Venetians coped with the Catalans, but in doing so chey
proved the vulnerability of their position in the East, as well as the failure
of all attempts to imite European powers in the Eastern Mediterranean.
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